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ABSTRACT
Scientists often worry that their evidence is not used properly in
the policy-making process. Their main response is to change the
supply of evidence to reduce policymaker uncertainty. They
should focus more on ambiguity, combining evidence and persua-
sion to help policymakers define the policy problem. To do so,
they need to understand the policy process in which they engage.
They cannot do so alone. Policy scholars can help, by articulating
the practical value of policy theories. To help most effectively,
they need to state clearly the “causal mechanisms” of the policy
process. For example, what causes policymakers to pay attention
to an issue informed partly by evidence, or what rules guide their
behavior most strongly when weighing up evidence with other
factors? In this paper, we show that policy theories have informed
this debate, but often without making explicit statements of caus-
ality. We draw on the social science causal mechanisms field to
improve such analysis and suggest use qualitative methods to
clarify and measure causal mechanisms to benefit policy scholars
and the wider policy analysis community. A focus on mechanisms
can inform policy scholarship, science community engagement
and on-the-ground policy work.
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1. How can we make scientific evidence count? Develop a mechanism-
based theory of policy processes and foster new analytical methods
Fears about the diminishing role of experts and expertise seem to dominate plenary
discussion at conferences on science advice to government (Gluckman 2011).
Scientific articles and commentaries reinforce this picture. A large literature on the
“barriers” to evidence impact on policy, and exemplar commentaries, blame decision-
makers for failing to make decisions based on the best evidence (Oliver, Lorenc, and
Innvaer 2014; Sutherland and Wordley 2017). Few studies describe how the policy
process works or how to engage effectively to improve the use of scientific evidence
(Oliver, Lorenc, and Innvaer 2014). Therefore, the literature usually suggests that to
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bridge the science-policy gap we must reduce uncertainty by improving (a) the scien-
tific literacy of politicians, and (b) the communication of scientific insights, such as
by producing shorter reports with less jargon, to (c) increase the impact of scientific
findings (Oliver, Lorenc, and Innvaer 2014; Cairney 2016). Meanwhile, within govern-
ment departments, there has been a focus on increasing “analytical policy capacity” in
order to enhance the possibility of policy success by improving the amount and type
of information processed in public policy decision-making (Howlett 2009, 157). This
evidence-based approach is also focused on addressing uncertainty. Howlett defines
analytical policy as “the amount of basic research a government can conduct or
access, its ability to apply statistical methods, applied research methods, and advanced
modelling techniques to this data and employ analytical techniques such as environ-
mental scanning, trends analysis, and forecasting methods in order to gauge broad
public opinion and attitudes, as well as those of interest groups and other major pol-
icy players, and to anticipate future policy impacts” (p.162). Yet, for both scientists
and policy analysts reducing or even understanding uncertainty is only half the battle.
Equally important is the need to minimize policy ambiguity: the lack of agreement
on the causal nature of the problem and the most appropriate solution, determined
by evidence and values. Policy problems and solutions can be interpreted and framed
in multiple ways. People exercise power to persuade policymakers to adopt certain
frames; such as to treat tobacco as an epidemic not an economic good, or to under-
stand “fracking” as an economic opportunity rather than a potential public health risk
(Cairney 2016). One can entertain multiple “images” of a problem, but to focus pri-
marily on one image is to signal a dominant way to define and solve a problem
(Baumgartner and Jones 2010).
Scientists often have less to say about ambiguity, for two reasons. First, many try
to draw an artificial line between facts and values, or science and politics, and prefer
to be the “honest broker” rather than “issue advocate” (Pielke 2007; Jasanoff 2008;
Douglas 2009; Smith and Stewart 2017). Second, they do not understand the policy
process. For example, it is common to discuss evidence use with reference to a myth-
ical “policy cycle” (Oxman et al. 2009; Cairney 2016) or a mysterious “black box” con-
taining irrational policymakers with low “political will,” responsible for unpredictable
and suboptimal outcomes (Biesbroek et al. 2015).
Policy analysts have also been largely silent on policy process and instead are either
focused on highly technical methods (e.g. cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment)
measuring or predicting policy outcomes or are more likely occupy the ranks of gen-
eralists who are more concerned with the day-to-day business of the departmental
demands (Page and Jenkins 2005). Cairney and Weible (2017) lament that “policy
analysis research is often conducted with an insufficient appreciation of basic science,
and policy process research is often esoteric and detached from practice” (p.620).
Policy process theories already suggest ways to engage in policy making (Cairney
et al. 2015). First, use persuasion strategies to influence policymakers who draw on
“rational” and “irrational” ways to make decisions. Combine factual and emotional
arguments, tell stories with a hero and moral, frame the implications of evidence with
relation to the beliefs of key actors, and exploit temporary opportunities in which pol-
icymakers are receptive to new ideas (Kingdon 1986; True, Jones, and Baumgartner
1999; Jones and McBeth 2010; Weible, Heikkila, and Sabatier 2012; Cairney and
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Kwiatkowski 2017). Second, adapt to complex policymaking environments containing
many actors at multiple levels and types of government, each with their own institu-
tions, networks, and dominant ways of seeing the world, and influenced in different
ways by socio-economic conditions (Cairney et al. 2015). Successful adaptation
requires us to engage for long-term to understand the “rules of the game” and form
relationships with key actors to earn their trust and understand how they think.
Yet, these recommendations are often vague and may be unhelpful to practitioners.
Therefore, this article shows how we can improve understanding and effective engage-
ment by identifying clearly the causal mechanisms of policy processes. Although the
mechanisms concept has been widely employed in history, political science, and soci-
ology, it has received at best scant attention in the policy field. This paper represents
one of the first explicit attempts to discuss mechanisms in a policy process context.
First, it explains the meaning of causal mechanisms and their role in explanation.
Second, it focuses on mechanisms relating to the ways in which policy actors address
ambiguity. Finally, it describes the payoffs to policy scholarship, science community
engagement, and on-the-ground policy work.
2. Peering into the “Gray” box of the policy process
Weible and Sabatier (2018) argues that “causal drivers” are at the heart of the scien-
tific assumptions underlying policy theories. Given that many of these frameworks
were intended as guides to hypothesis generation and empirical testing, there is sur-
prisingly little granular reference to causality. Causation is often implied or sketched,
and there are few explicit discussions of causal mechanisms (Yee 1996; Johns 2003;
Steinberg 2007; Real-Dato 2009; Nowlin 2011; Kay and Baker 2015) . Bunge described
such incomplete theorizing as a “gray box theory” where causality is assumed but the
mechanisms are poorly described and hypotheses are often infrequently tested
Morgan and Winship (2014) describe “mechanism sketches” in contrast to
“mechanism schema” where the component parts or entities are known. This is the
possibility that contributors to the literature using policy-process frameworks may
engage in implicit mechanistic thinking even if they do not explicitly use mechanism
language, particularly when operationalizing frameworks for empirical studies.
Instead, we need to develop a “translucent” box that identifies the specific details
about mechanisms or the cause and effect relationships, such as to explain the cause
of policymaker attention to evidence on policy problems and their receptivity to evi-
dence-informed policy solutions. When the nature of the mechanism is understood,
inferences can be made and rigorous methods are applied. Identifying causal mecha-
nisms helps us to explain how and why some evidence-advocacy strategies have the
desired effect and others are resisted.
3. Practical lessons from a mechanisms approach
We argue that all scholars should be interested in causality, but also focus on practical
steps. To do so requires a simple definition of causation, but few exist beyond the
identification of actions or entities which produce a regular series of changes from a
beginning state to an ending (McAdam et al. 2008). Such discussions of change
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usually “invoke some form of ‘causal agent’ that is assumed to have generated the
relationship between the entities observed” and “are analytical constructs that provide
hypothetical links between observable events” (Hedstr€om and Swedberg 1998). In
other words, we theorize the world to identify its key components and their relation-
ship to policy change. A mechanisms approach is best suited to understand causality
in within-case study research which dominates policy research.
Simply put, scholars interested in studying mechanisms are focused on the connec-
tion between cause and effects (Beach and Pedersen 2016). This can be a difficult task
because mechanisms are often unobservable or hidden phenomena. They are sensitive
to variations in context and triggering activators such as events, occurrences, or deci-
sions that trigger or stimulate mechanisms (Pawson and Tilly 1997). Thus, assessing
the logic of association helps us to make theory-drive causal inferences (Falleti and
Lynch 2009). To identify mechanistic nature of causality requires to uncover empiric-
ally traceable processes which will uncover how X produces Y under specific condi-
tions by describing “properties of the relationships among phenomena with the
potential to recur, which helps explain why X causes Y” (Hall 2013, 21).
Context is crucial to this relationship. Initial conditions play a key role in deter-
mining how mechanisms are triggered. Identifying the context and the mechanism is
important when formulating hypotheses. Key aspects of a “setting” influence when
and how certain mechanisms are triggered and how they play out. Context is also
critical because similar initial conditions may lead to dissimilar outcomes (multifinal-
ity) and outcomes can be reached from any number of different developmental paths
(equifinality) (Biesbroek, Dupuis, and Wellstead 2017). Various scholars have adopted
Pawson and Tilly’s well-known “context-mechanism-outcome” (CMO) approach:
namely the observed patterns of (un)intended outcomes can be explained by identify-
ing the plausible causal set of mechanisms within the situational context of the pro-
cess (Pawson and Tilly 1997) (Figure 1). Pawson and Tilly (1997) applied the CMO
approach to explain the impact of policy interventions to explain larger social
changes. We go one step further, to argue that we can use a CMO approach to make
sense of the ways in which policy process theories explain specific types of pol-
icy change.
This understanding of causality permits the skeptical scientist to open up the black
or gray boxes of policy-making. In doing so, they will find a diversity of causal mech-
anisms that affect and explain policy outcomes. At first glance, there are different
Figure 1. Context mechanism output (CMO) model. Source: Pawson and Tilly (1997).
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broad mechanism types: structural (e.g. environment, institutions), cognitive (e.g.
individual perceptions and ideas), and relational (e.g. network connections between
people). Second, mechanisms can span between micro-level (individual) and macro-
level (structural) phenomena (Bunge 1997; Checkel 2006). Given the multi-level
nature of policy making these mechanisms are particularly important. These are
illustrated in Figure 2. “Situational” mechanisms occur when social structures or
environmental phenomenon constrain individuals’ action or shape and beliefs.
“Action-formation” mechanisms link individual micro-level activities or behavior to
their actions. Transformational mechanisms are those in which individuals, through
their actions and interactions, generate intended and unintended outcomes.
Third, mechanisms have temporal features which are often overlooked (Pierson
2003; Beach and Pedersen 2013). For example, some slow-moving causal processes
result in a threshold event that result a sudden change. In the policy and social sci-
ence, there are many examples of mechanisms that fit these broad categories.
Identifying high-level and abstract mechanisms in policy theory still leaves the under-
standing of the causal factors within policy theory in a gray causal box (Sartori 1970;
Falleti and Lynch 2008).
Drawing from Sartori’s (1970) “ladder of abstraction,” Falleti and Lynch (2008)
argue that more compelling and measurable causal explanations can only be realized
if mechanisms are disaggregated from a high level of abstraction, which they label as
“processes,” “mechanisms-as-type,” and “mechanisms-as-example.” They claim that
“mechanisms-as-cause” and “mechanism-as-indicators” are critical to making a meas-
urable causal claim and to describe how things happen. Alternatively, Machamer,
Darden, and Craver (2000) argue that mechanisms are often nested hierarchies that
contain “lower level entities, properties, and activities” that “produce higher level phe-
nomena” (p.13). There are “the components that are accepted as relatively fundamen-
tal or taken to be unproblematic” as far as the observables in the data (Morgan and
Winship 2014, 239). Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) borrow from molecular
biology and find that mechanisms “bottom out in descriptions of the activities of
macromolecules, smaller molecules, and ions” (p.14). Identifying mechanisms in
this way helps us describe key dynamics such as the use of evidence in the policy pro-
cess. By doing so, researchers and practitioners will able to understand broad causal
issues that define problem definitions (e.g. poverty causes health inequalities).
Situaonal 
Mechanisms
Acon-Formaon Mechanisms
Transformaonal 
Mechanisms
Micro Level: Actors such as individuals or organizaons
Macro Level: Contextual factors such as organizaonal ﬁelds, and naons 
Figure 2. “Bath tub” approach for identifying different levels of mechanisms.
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Fortunately, policy scholarship has developed many mechanism-like concepts
which are currently employed in policy process frameworks. For example, procedural
rationality underpins the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). ACF scholars have
championed the “devil shift” a psychological process whereby individuals exaggerate
the negative motives, behavior, and influence of opponents (Weible and Sabatier
2018). Bounded rationality and incrementalism are central to the multiple streams
approach. Policy layering and drift concepts are found in the policy feedback theory.
The challenge will be to systematically identify and organize the full suite of policy-
oriented mechanisms. To do so will require the integration of policy analysis and the
policy process by suggesting a mechanistic-based evidence policy analysis.
4. A new lens on analytical policy capacity: mechanistic-based evidence
policy analysis
A mechanistic-based analysis style is critical because “when the procedural sides of a
policy making or decision-making process have been thought through properly, it will
greatly increase the likelihood of substantive problems being resolved” (Mayer,
Daalen, and Bots 2013, 181). The policy research and analysis communities should be
interested in testing policy mechanisms so as to measure policy-oriented causal infer-
ences and explain outcomes in more practical terms. Typically, qualitative methods
are associated with small N between-case and within-case studies, which are so preva-
lent in policy process research (Steinberg 2007). When the mechanisms are known,
analysts can collect diagnostic evidence, theorize variables and empirical proxies, and
test hypotheses which then provide a narrative explaining how a particular outcome
or set of events came about (Kay and Baker 2015).
Rather than testing for probability, mechanistic policy analysts begin with consider-
ing necessary and sufficient conditions, which is derived from Boolean logic, as their
criteria (Kay and Baker 2015). Necessity refers to the situation where a causal factor
(X) is a necessary condition if the outcome (Y) occurs only if X exists whereas suffi-
ciency refers to the situation in which a condition (X) itself can produce the outcome
without the help of other conditions.1 Process tracing is central to the empirical and
theoretical development of mechanism research (Mahoney 2015).
Process tracing, which is more of a general approach than a specific method, can
investigate understanding a simplistic change of events related to a single phenom-
enon, the convergence of a number of conditions, or complex interactions causal fac-
tors (Meyfroidt 2016; Trampusch and Palier 2016). This is often achieved by
converting narratives into mechanistic explanations. Beach (2017) argues that analysts
can develop minimalist or systematic understandings of mechanisms. A minimalist
approach considers only diagnostic evidence. A systematic approach explicitly unpacks
the causal process and delves into understanding the empirical fingerprint that the
mechanism makes and unpacking it into its constituent parts. In part, this can be a
function of the variety of information sources collected (archival documents, inter-
views, reports, memos) that are accumulated over a given period of time are referred
to as causal process observations (Charbonneau et al. 2017).
Beach and Pedersen (2013) identify three approaches to process tracing, namely:
theory-testing, theory building, and explaining outcomes. Theory-testing process
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tracing is employed when a phenomenon X is causing outcome Y is known but the
mechanism is not specified. Since mechanisms are portable concepts they can be
applied by policy researchers to further elaborate the long-term nature of policy
change (Falleti and Lynch 2009). Theory-building process-tracing is undertaken when
the relationship between X and Y is detected but the researcher cannot identify the
mechanism or when the outcome (Y) is known, but X is unknown. In both cases, the
researcher develops a new mechanism. Beach and Pedersen (2013) describe Janis’
(2013) development of “groupthink” mechanism as the cause of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
Theory-building requires considerably more time and effort than theory-testing. In
explaining-outcome process tracing the outcome Y is known but X is unknown or the
researcher is interested in fully explaining why Y happened. In each type of process
tracing, the analyst will develop a causal mechanism. The second step involves opera-
tionalizing the mechanism based on “observable manifestation” from different types
of evidence.2 From collecting such information, the inferential weight of the evidence
and the hypotheses can be assessed using four well-known tests that apply set-theor-
etic analysis of event (straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive
tests) (See Van Evera 1997; George and Bennett 2005). These tests examine necessary
and/or sufficient conditions for inferring evidence from the hypotheses exist. The
principles of certainty and uniqueness of the evidence reflect the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. The straw-in-the-wind test supports or weakens a hypothesis but
does not exclude it. The smoking-gun test confirms the hypothesis but does not
exclude other hypotheses. Hoop tests reject a hypothesis but do not influence other
hypotheses and a double-decisive test confirms a single hypothesis and disconfirms
other rival hypotheses. Finally, analysts can apply more formal probabilistic Bayesian
perspectives that use set theory and necessary/sufficient conditions (Ulriksen and
Dadalauri 2016).
5. What is a policy mechanism about and for?
It may sometimes be tempting to think that politics is dysfunctional; that the number
of likes of a tweet holds sway over scientific expertise. Yet, there is a big difference
between a policy process that does not work and a process we do not understand
enough to influence with evidence. If we know more about causal mechanisms, we can
tell the difference and act accordingly. In the case of ambiguity, an effective strategy is
to influence the debate on what causes policy problems before people use evidence to
try to solve them. In some cases, presenting more information and analysis that reduces
uncertainty may even be counterproductive. We argue that the ambiguous nature of the
policy-making process requires attention. There is a growing interest in the utility of
policy theory in bridging the illusive scientific evidence-policy gap, and the role that
evidence plays in an environment of growing ambiguity. Causal mechanisms have been
overlooked because they are usually hidden but are sensitive to variations in context. A
toolkit equipped with well-elaborated mechanisms is not only useful for precision and
depth to understand the generative processes of existing theoretical models but is also
valuable for empirical research and enhancing policy-making decisions (Tranow,
Beckers, and Becker 2016).
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Theories of the policy process are currently presented to the scientific community
as a helpful heuristic technique that uncovers the bewildering world of politics. This
is a positive step. Ironically, although causality is assumed, very little is actually
understood about underlying mechanisms in these approaches thus relegating them to
causal gray boxes. However, a significant pay off can be achieved by incorporating
causality, inference, and hypothesis testing as part of this research agenda.
Policy scholars should take up the challenge and identify more specific mechanisms
via process tracing in existing social science theories or develop new mechanisms.
This, we argue may lead to improving, changing, or refuting the broad and sometimes
vague assumptions about existing theories and frameworks. However, in order to fully
understand the policy ambiguities associated with the policy process, it is necessary to
go beyond theoretical discussion of mechanism and empirically identify causal process
observations and make inferences.
By taking a new approach to policy science more seriously, this research should
provide an enlightenment function for scientists by changing the focus of the debate
and rearticulating the nature of policy problems (Weiss 1977). Rather than a one-way
stream of data, research, findings, and advice that often goes unheeded by decision-
makers, the policy-science interface is “a series of spaces with multiple knowledge
types, political interests and ongoing deliberation” (Evans et al. 2017). The policy pro-
cess literature provides insights into such deliberations. However, by adopting a more
rigorous approach, specifically an emphasis on the causal nature of policy-making,
greater buy-in from skeptical scientists can be achieved. A mechanism-based approach
also eliminates the longstanding divide between policy analysis and policy theory. By
employing methods such as process tracing, a new avenue for analytical policy cap-
acity can be realized.
Thus, the policy scholar, scientist, and public official can benefit from deeper
understanding of causal mechanisms. We call on policy scientists to become the crea-
tors of policy-based mechanisms, scientists the consumers, and on-the-ground govern-
ment officials to empirically employ them. By doing so, this may lead to what Dietz,
Ostrom, and Stern (2003) refer to as “analytical deliberation” which provides for
“improved information and the trust in it that is essential for information to be used
effectively, builds social capital, and can allow deal with inevitable conflicts” (p.1910).
Notes
1. Researchers can also undertake counterfactual and convergence analysis (See Beach and
Pedersen 2016).
2. Beach and Pedersen refer to this evidence as account evidence (empirical material such as
interviews, meetings, focus groups), trace evidence (were the existence provides proof),
pattern evidence (statistical patterns), and sequence evidence (chronology of events).
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